Saturday, January 12, 2013

The Infinite Library

I should probably tell you why this blog is located at myinfinitelibrary.blogspot.com, why it is my infinite library, and what an infinite library is.

I don't have all the answers. That's what an infinite library is not.

In fact, my infinite library is very different from other infinite libraries. It's a concept that was introduced to me by a professor from Germany who taught a course called Modernism and Beyond in European and World Literature to me when I studied abroad at Universiteit Maastricht in the Spring semester of 2012.

I liked this professor because he knew we would not like everything we read in his class, and he did not ask us to like it or even try to like it--he only asked us to try to appreciate it and learn from it, and to try to understand why we did or did not like each book we read. What all did we read? Gosh... Demian, Nadja, To the Lighthouse, Heart of Darkness, "The Wasteland," "Waiting for Godot," Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man... perhaps something else. That sounds comprehensive to me. Perhaps I'll talk about those books later. Demian in particular changed the way I look at the world, and it was fantastic. I regret that the books were provided by the school and I did not get to keep my notes.

In any case, the professor presented in passing an idea he called the infinite library, and which I have probably revised since hearing it. This idea is the biggest thing I garnered from this class, and has changed my world view more than anything we read or anything else we talked about. I vaguely remember him crediting this idea to T.S. Eliot, but have found nothing to support that. There is apparently an infinite library concept introduced by Terry Pratchett, but it is rather different insofar as I can tell. The infinite library as I think of it is this:

When you are born, your infinite library is essentially empty. It is an infinite room full of infinite shelves full of no books at all. From that point on, every single thing you hear, taste, smell, read, touch, or experience becomes a book in your infinite library--but each book is not free-standing. Oh, no! Each book is affected by every single other book already in your infinite library, and as your infinite library grows, everything you experience thus become deeper and more multi-layered and more meaningful, more connected. In the physical world, a poem is the same every time someone reads it. The words stay the same in spelling, meaning, order, and juxtaposition; the punctuation is constant; the number of lines is unchanged; and so on. But the infinite library is another matter! In the infinite library, every time you read the same poem, an entirely new book is added to your infinite library, because it was an entirely different experience for you. Even if nothing else has changed, the second time you read it you already know how it is going to end--and more than likely, other things have changed. You may have undergone more and more varied struggles, you may have fallen in love, you may have read another book--and so this new experience of reading it is separate from the first and any other previous times you may have read it.

This can be applied to anything, not just literature--when I rode carousels as a child it was for the novelty alone; now it is for the novelty as well as for the nostalgia, and when I do I think of the carousel I rode in Paris and how it was next to a beignet stand and it was a foggy day; how all the horses on the Disneyland carousel are white so children don't fight over them; how Griffith Park refuses to accept help to refurbish their carousel; how I used to be a member of the Santa Monica carousel when I was very little, and once met Sean Penn and his kid there; what my own carousel would be like if I had one--you can have your very own for just over five hundred thousand dollars! (I know, I know... I can't afford that either)... and so on.

Anyhow, that is that. I don't know how much I'll talk about the infinite library on this blog, but I talk about it a lot in real life, so there you have it.



Happy New Year!

Tuesday, December 11, 2012

On Shakespeare’s “The Two Gentlemen of Verona”: An Evaluation of the Love (or Lack Thereof) Within and What it Means for Modern Audiences

My professor didn't like this paper, but I do. Perhaps you will too. Either way, comments are welcome.



            The Two Gentlemen of Verona, one of William Shakespeare’s very earliest plays, is a comedy centered mainly around four love interests, whom we will call protagonists for the sake of a limited vocabulary: Julia, a woman of Verona; her sworn lover, Proteus (also of Verona); his secondary love interest, Silvia (a woman of Milan); and her sworn lover, Valentine (Proteus’ closest friend, also of Verona). Like many of his other plays, Shakespeare has somehow managed to write a captivating and enjoyable love story about some not-very-likable (or at least not-very-admirable) lovers. Proteus and Valentine particularly are so wealthy in faults that I am reluctant to call them lovers at all (Julia is more virtuous than either of the men, but possesses plenty of faults in her own right; Silvia, but for a minor detail, I will venture to call admirable, and perhaps even a lover), and it is for this reason that I say I settle for the title of protagonist rather than use it freely. Yes, the audience is rooting for these four characters; but myself at least was rooting for them to mature and experience an epiphany rather than for them to end up with the objects of their affections, because it is clear to me as a reader that none of these people (except perhaps Silvia) is ready for a relationship at all—although, to be fair, perhaps they deserve each other. My proposition, then, is this, in two parts: first, that there is no real, true love in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, with the possible exception of the relationship between Valentine and Silvia; and second, that the false love in The Two Gentlemen of Verona provides none of the benefits of real love and brings about a myriad of problems and complications, as it serves as a catalyst for treachery, deceit, and evasion of personal responsibility. We will also find, I think, that while the social atmosphere of the time and place where The Two Gentlemen of Verona is set is indeed particularly conducive to false love relationships, many of the issues on which it sheds light are still absolutely present in individuals and relationships in the real world today.
            When I say there is no real love in Shakespeare’s The Two Gentlemen of Verona, I do not say so without reason. Before even examining the psychology of love, emotions, self-esteem, and relationships, there is a clever clue to this idea in the literature independent of recent psychological research. Silvia, as can be seen in numerous examples of writing from Shakespeare’s contemporaries and near-contemporaries, was often used as a generic name to represent a woman of romantic interest (Townsend), such as in the aria by Alessandro Parisotti, “Se tu m’ami, se sospiri” (“If you love me, if you sigh”). In this aria, the singer is rejecting her suitor’s notion that by accepting his suit she must reject all others, and refers to herself as Silvia because she is the object of many men’s affections (“Bella rosa porporina/ Oggi Silvia sceglierĂ /...Non perchĂ© mi piace il giglio/ Gli altri fiori sprezzerò” (Rolli), or, “The beautiful purple rose/ Will Silvia choose today;/ …Just because the lily pleases me,/ I do not have to despise the other flowers” (Ezust). By giving the object of Valentine’s, Proteus’, and Thurio’s love the name Silvia, Shakespeare may well be making his own clever stab at the superficiality of the love. Certainly as far as Proteus and Thurio (another of Silvia’s suitors, and the one preferred by her father) are concerned, Silvia could have been any girl. We have already seen that Proteus is no stranger to falling for a woman just because she’s a living, breathing woman (and the qualities of living and breathing do not seem altogether necessary as he is eventually willing to settle for worshiping a portrait of Silvia in the case that Silvia herself is unwilling to be the object of Proteus’ knee-jerk emotional reactions to womanhood: “I am very loath to be your idol, sir,/ But… your falsehood shall become you well/ To worship shadows and adore false shapes” (4.2.121-3)), and Thurio gives up his pursuit of Silvia’s love without argument when it becomes clear that Valentine and Silvia have chosen each other.
According to a study linking self-esteem to six different styles of love and relationships (eros, ludos, pragma, storge, mania, and agape), people who love erotically and/or ludically are likely to be people with very high self-esteem, and “[t]he same reasoning should apply in reverse for Mania. In fact, one reason manic lovers are manic is because of uncertainty of self in the relationship” (Hendrick). The ability to love others has long been linked with the ability to love oneself, and although it is unclear what the causal chain of events is in this correlation, it is absolutely clear that the correlation exists (Campbell). Of course, it will be necessary to first define erotic, ludic, and manic love, in order to understand the implications herein. The aforementioned study measured people of each love/relationship type by asking subjects to agree or disagree (in degrees) with seven questions per each of the six love styles (I will here discuss only the three which are correlated with self-esteem): erotic lovers (associated with high self-esteem) were likely to agree that chemistry and attraction were strong from the beginning and remain passionate, that their partners fit their ideal standards of beauty, and that they and their partners “get,” or understand, each other to the point that they were meant for each other; ludic lovers (also associated with high self-esteem) are unlikely to commit or express a desire to commit, remain mysterious to their partner, keep secrets, and avoid responsibility in relationships; manic lovers, on the other hand (associated with very low self-esteem), are likely to agree with the following statements:
“29. When things aren't right with my lover and me, my stomach gets upset.
30. When my love affairs break up, I get so depressed that I have even thought of suicide.
31. Sometimes I get so excited about being in love that I can't sleep.
32. When my lover doesn't pay attention to me, I feel sick all over.
33. When I am in love, I have trouble concentrating on anything else.
34. I cannot relax if I suspect that my lover is with someone else.
35. If my lover ignores me for a while, I sometimes do stupid things to get his/her attention back” (Hendrick).
None of our protagonists possess qualities and/or values for either of the two discussed healthy forms of love (and you may take my word for it that they do not show particular proclivity towards storge, pragma, or agape, either). The exceptions to this are that Proteus chases after two different women over the course of the play (but his reasons and methods are not indicative of ludic love, rather simply of being fickle, indecisive, and traitorous), and Silvia, who I will grant does appear to have more healthy self-esteem than the other characters, and an at least somewhat ludic style of love (she strings Proteus along writing letters to himself like a game), but she also seems over-eager to commit to “the one” as a form of validation. Everyone in love is absolutely more than willing (the word “pushy” might not be out of place here) to commit, even exchanging rings and vows of eternal love (2.2.4-12), and going so far as to plan to elope together after having known each other only a few days. Julia only picked Proteus because her nurse, Lucetta, recommended him as her favorite of Julia’s suitors, so it would be inaccurate to acknowledge immediate chemistry, and the same goes for Proteus and Silvia—when Valentine first pointed Silvia and her beauty out to Proteus, Proteus refused to acknowledge that she was anything more than reasonably pretty. Valentine and Silvia might be granted the “ideal standards of beauty” card but for that Proteus claims that love is blind (or at least blinding) and Valentine cannot accurately judge Silvia’s beauty because he is so taken with the glamour he has put on her by means of his superficial love for her (2.1.43-65). The point I am trying to make here is that none of the characters can possibly be in “real love” because none of the characters are secure enough in themselves to do so (Campbell), which, even without refuting the five healthy forms of love as possibilities, can be more than easily proven by exemplifying how each of the characters fits the manic model of love (the model with a direct correlation to low self-esteem).
            To prove this, allow me to address the symptoms of manic love in order, one by one. When Valentine “falls in love” with Silvia, he becomes melancholy and melodramatic; the thing he calls love has not improved him but has rather depressed and upset him. He is no longer healthy and energetic (2.1.15-30). This correlation between physical health and proximity (both physical and emotional) to one’s lover is a property of manic love (Hendrick). When Julia, handicapped by her own pride, tears her letter from Proteus into pieces, she falls to the floor in tears and proceeds down a path of self-deprecation: “O hateful hands, to tear such loving words!/ Injurious wasps, …Unkind Julia!/ I throw thy name against the bruising stones,/ Trampling contemptuously on thy disdain. … mine own name… some whirlwind bear/ Unto a ragged fearful-hanging rock/ And throw it thence into the raging sea!” (1.2.105-22) Like so, Julia insults herself several times over and wishes a series of ills on her name. It is not specified whether she wishes these ills on her written name only or on herself in actuality, but either way it is fair to say that Julia fits the description of depression and thoughts of self-harm listed as being symptomatic of manic love (Hendrick). The third identifying statement of manic love from Hendrick’s study refers to losing sleep over love, for which Valentine first makes fun of Proteus: “one fading moment’s mirth [bought]/ With twenty watchful, weary, tedious nights” (1.1.30-1), and then, after falling for Silvia, specifically says he does: “[Love’s] high imperious thoughts have punished me/ With bitter fasts, with penitential groans,/ With nightly tears and daily heart-sore sighs./ For in revenge of my contempt of love/ Love hath chased sleep from my enthralled eyes,/ And made them watchers of mine own heart’s sorrow” (2.4.123-8). It seems unnecessary to address the fifth identifying statement of manic love, “When I am in love, I have trouble concentrating on anything else” (Henrick), as it is obvious this applies. The entire play, insofar as the four protagonists are speaking, revolves around love and love relationships. It is clear that they can concentrate on nothing else. Julia “cannot relax [when she] suspect[s] that [her] lover is with someone else” (Hendrick), and goes so far to calm this upset as to dress in the habit of a man and travel to Milan to find out what Proteus is up to. It is therefore apparent that the four protagonists of The Two Gentlemen of Verona suffer from low self-esteem and an unhealthy class of love emotions.
Because of the low self-love these characters demonstrate, and in turn because of the unhealthy love relationships in which they find themselves, these characters’ faults (some of which are caused by low self-love, and some of which may encourage it) are magnified ten-fold over the course of the play. A perfect example, Proteus is the representational epitome of all that is wrong with the characters in “The Two Gentlemen of Verona.” Many of his faults make appearances in the other characters, but nearly all the faults of any character in this play are concentrated in him. The exception is that, misguided as he is, Proteus is intelligent and quick-witted, a virtue possessed by all in the play except perhaps Lance, whom I will regard more as a vehicle for comic relief than as a character in his own right. Proteus does not, however, use his wit and intelligence to good ends, so perhaps this so-called virtue is better referred to as cunning and thought of as a fault. Because the love Proteus experiences is unreal and unhealthy, it moves him to act on his faults rather than his virtues, and he resolves to “leave [him]self, [his] friends, and all, for love” (1.1.65). One thing Proteus is very good at, however, is suppressing what little conscience he does have whenever it makes a sad attempt at contributing to the plot. Even when Proteus speaks aloud of his deceits and double-crossing, his confession to the Duke is actually no more than a device to further his own desires, a deceit to make him look better, and is carried out for the ignoble cause of winning the hand of a twice-claimed woman who will not have him. “Thus, for my duty’s sake, I rather chose/ To cross my friend,” he confesses to the Duke, Silvia’s father (3.1.17-8), when he reveals Valentine’s plan to elope with Silvia that night. To be fair, Valentine is also going against the wishes of the Duke her father, but Silvia herself is head-over-heels in her consent and their love seems more genuine than any other relationship in the play (though for reasons mentioned earlier I will not grant that it is true love, no matter how much the lovers themselves would have me believe it is so), so however deeply Valentine may be in the wrong, Proteus is infinitely more deeply so. It may just be that the only honest remark Proteus makes out loud to another character is when he tells the Duke, Silvia’s father, that he himself is “undeserving” of the gracious favors the Duke has bestowed upon him (3.1.7).
Still, even the Duke, desiring only to marry his daughter to a man he deems worthy and thus protect her (an altogether noble cause), is not immune to lying and deceiving others to reach his desired ends. After Proteus informs him of Valentine’s plan to steal away with Silvia in the night and elope, the Duke intercepts Valentine and begins to fabricate a tale of some “lady of Verona” who is supposedly staying in Milan and will not accept the Duke’s advances upon her. This provokes an instance of something that happens throughout the whole play: Valentine insists that the invented lady of Verona is simply playing hard to get, that “If she do chide, ‘tis not to have you gone,” and instructs the Duke to “Take no repulse, whatever she doth say:/ For ‘Get you gone’ she doth not mean ‘Away’” (3.1.98,100-1). The situation with the lady of Verona may have been hypothetical as far as the Duke was concerned, and simply a vehicle for discovering Valentine’s treachery against him, but it is very concerning that Valentine would take that attitude towards consent, which brings us to Valentine’s faults.
            Valentine has a clearly very shallow view of love considering that he thinks he is neck-deep in it. He refuses to understand that the woman actually has a point of view, feelings of her own, and a say in matters. The women in the play do not exactly propitiate the idea that no means no, as Julia says that “maids, in modesty, say 'no' to that/ Which they would have the profferer construe 'ay'” (1.2.55-56), and, to be fair, this is a miscommunication that still occurs even today because of a lack of willingness from both men and women to either communicate clearly and/or to reliably interpret anything less straightforward than a flat “yes” or “no” with eye contact (Hess). However, Valentine nevertheless displays an absolute immersion in rape culture and the belief that ‘no’ means ‘yes’ with his advice to the Duke and his behavior towards Silvia later in the play. Valentine furthermore, when first pointing Silvia out to Proteus upon Proteus’ arrival at the court of Milan, refers to Silvia as “a heavenly saint… divine,” and begs of him, “O flatter me; for love delights in praises” (2.4.138-42). This request serves to demonstrate only that Valentine is indeed deceived by the glamours his own love or imitation thereof places on Silvia’s countenance, and that he is willingly submitting himself to the deceit because it is pleasant, and provides a form of instant gratification and shallow satisfaction.
            Regarding women, particularly Julia: the fact of the matter is that Julia is in love with a man who would falsely swear unto her, leave her for another woman (who does not even care for him), and betray his best friend; she is indubitably foolish, but she at least is mostly virtuous. This creates a strange juxtaposition of virtue and deceit, however, since so as to maintain her virtue (virginity and thus fidelity), she must take part in a deceit of her own: she refuses to travel to Milan in the habit of “a woman, [in order to] prevent/ The loose encounters of lascivious men” (2.7.40-1), and so she takes on the appearance of a pageboy. Even a deceit such as this, in which she partakes for safety, security, and virtue (unlike Proteus’ deceits, which are false acts for false ends), Julia is worried will tarnish her good name (2.7.61).
            But still, these motions she makes and the trouble she takes is all for the love of a man who is completely unworthy and undeserving. Even if he were truly in love with Julia, he is dishonorable in his show of it. Then, when he does make mistakes (there is no want of examples), Proteus repeatedly refuses to take responsibility for his actions, blaming them instead on the force of love itself. When he first hears that Julia has refused his advances, he blames the messenger, and resolves that he “must go send some better messenger./ I fear my Julia would not deign my lines,/ Receiving them from such a worthless post” (1.1.140-1). As he is contemplating a plan of action for how best to win the hand of Silvia, he says to himself, “To leave my Julia shall I be forsworn;/ To love fair Silvia shall I be forsworn;/ To wrong my friend I shall be much forsworn./ And e’en that power which gave me first my oath/ Provokes me to this three-fold perjury./ Love bade me swear, and love bids me forswear” (2.6.1-6). As if it were not enough to call love the cause of his own faults, Proteus then continues to blame love directly as if it were a self-governing, autonomously active force: “O sweet-suggesting love, if thou hast sinned/ Teach me, thy tempted subject, to excuse it” (2.6.7-8).
            None of this would be so bad if it were all for the sake of story, as watching other people suffer in rhyme does tend to make for good entertainment, but the behaviors demonstrated by these characters do not stop at the edge of the stage. Even today in the United States, where women have (on paper, at least) equal rights to men, there is still the social construct that women play hard to get, and it’s not helped by the fact that many women do play hard to get. However, the few times that a woman’s flirtatious “no” means “I want you to ask again” do not make up for the great majority of the time when “no” actually means “no.” It also does not help that we have created a culture in which saying “no” directly is considered offensive, and because people have been conditioned to protect themselves from offense by sheltering what little self-esteem they have instead of actually embarking upon a journey of self-improvement in response to constructive criticism, to avoid offending people we are urged by society to find less direct and more polite ways of saying “no” (Hess).
            Thus, the best way to read The Two Gentlemen of Verona is not as entertainment, but rather as a warning. Readers ought to be horrified that a character as virtuous and clever as Julia would have so little self-love and such low self-esteem that she would accept without hesitation when Proteus realizes his mistake and proposes to return to her. Audiences ought to be disgusted at the culture that shames clear communication in favor of a game that has always been dangerous physically and psychologically and is now dangerous legally. More than simply being horrified and disgusted, I would hope that readers and audiences would step back and look at their own lives, and honestly evaluate just how exciting a Shakespearean romance it would make (hint: if Shakespeare has written about your relationship or something like it, re-evaluate your current life path).



Works Cited
Campbell, W. Keith, Craig A. Foster, and Eli J. Finkel. "Does Self-love Lead to Love for Others?: A Story of Narcissistic Game Playing." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83.2 (2002): 340-54.PsycARTICLES. Web. .
Ezust, Emily, and Paulo Antonio Rolli. "If You Love Me, If You Sigh (Rolli, Set by Alessandro Parisotti, Antonio Vivaldi, Giovanni Battista Pergolesi (misattributed), Corona Elisabeth Wilhelmine Schraeter." The Lied, Art Song, and Choral Texts Archive. N.p., Sept. 2003. Web. .
Hendrick, Clyde, and Susan Hendrick. "A Theory and Method of Love." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50.2 (1986): n. pag. PsycARTICLES. Web. .
Hess, Amanda. "Why Rape Isn’t One Big Misunderstanding." The Sexist RSS. Washington City Paper, 24 Mar. 2010. Web. .
Rolli, Paulo Antonio. "Se Tu M'ami, Se Sospiri." Ed. G. Schirmer. Twenty-Four Italian Songs and Arias (of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries): Medium High. By Alessandro Parisotti. Hal Leonard Pub. Coporation: n.p., 1948. 68-71. Print.
Shakespeare, William, Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, Katharine Eisaman Maus, and Andrew Gurr. The Two Gentlemen of VeronaThe Norton Shakespeare. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 2008. 111-57. Print.
Townsend, Judith. "Voice Lesson: Parsing "Se Tu M'ami"" Personal interview. Oct. 2009.

Saturday, November 24, 2012

"Is There a God?": Notes on the Book by Richard Swinburne (VIII/VIII)


For more about what's going on here, see this post.

For those of you who'd like to follow along, this is the book I am reading:
          Swinburne, Richard. Is There a God? Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.
Epilogue: So What?
Summary
     This may be unfair, but this epilogue is so short that it can best be summarized in the following quote from it's own text: "The conclusion of this book was that, on significant balance of probability, there is a God. If you accept it, it follows that you have certain duties. God has given us life and all the good things it contains, including above all the opportunities to mould our characters and help others. ...if we have any sense and any idealism, we cannot leave [duty] at [a moderate amount of worship and obedience]" (122-3). Swinburne then proceeds to introduce new points like so (is that really necessary in an epilogue?) and then explain that god wants us to do our best and achieve great things, and since he created us we have a duty to do our best and achieve great things--he might choose to help us, but it is our duty to try whether he does or not, because he has already paid it forward more than we can ever compensate for.
Christian Response
     This isn't so much a Christian response as it is my response to this book and Christianity, but I feel like I am on the same page as Swinburne right up until the epilogue. I guess it's because worship is a weird thing for me. I've always felt like saying thank you and doing my best were the best ways to honor a god, rather than getting down on my knees and telling him/her/it how awesome he/she/it is and how I cower before him/her/it. I guess I feel like that would be awkward for god, because it's always really awkward when someone does that kind of thing to me. I am only human, though. I don't know. That's unrelated.
     What IS related is that I think a Christian would maybe feel a bit unfulfilled at the end of this book, just because it is, in the end, a theist book and not a Christian book. It is a book about there being a god, not about Jesus being the son of god and so on, and I don't think this book ever once mentioned Jesus. If Christianity decided Jesus and the biblical stories weren't so big a deal, though, and decided instead to just concentrate on ethics and being a moral person, then I think a good Christian could feel wholly supported by this book. That is, after all, what it's about: there is mostly likely a god, therefore you should do good stuff. If you're looking for more detail, read my previous eight blog posts or check out the book itself.
Personal Response
     Throughout this book, Swinburne provided plenty of support for the idea that there being a god makes sense. According to the points he makes, it does indeed make sense, and it obviously makes sense to me as I do believe in a god (that the god I believe in is not the Christian God is irrelevant). However, only in chapter 4 do I see him provide anything that could be considered proof of a god. Of course, there may not be such thing as proof--perhaps a better way to say it would be to say that chapter 4 is the only chapter in which he actually argues for a god being the most reasonable solution rather than simply saying that the existence of god is one reasonable solution among many he does not describe. That said, the reasons he gives in chapter 4 are the reasons, among others, that I believe in a god, and perhaps it is a good thing that the whole book does not read like a door-to-door evangelist, as I would have enjoyed reading that even less than reading what Swinburne did, in fact, write.


THE END
(...of this project, anyway; I fully intend to continue posting on this blog!)

Sunday, November 11, 2012

"Is There a God?": Notes on the Book by Richard Swinburne (VII/VIII)


For more about what's going on here, see this post.

For those of you who'd like to follow along, this is the book I am reading:
          Swinburne, Richard. Is There a God? Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.
Chapter VII: How the Existence of God Explains Miracles and Religious Experience
Summary
     Swinburne makes many points in this chapter, very few of which really act towards the claim in the chapter title. The only point he makes which does seem to prove that the existence of god explains miracles and religious experience is that "humans need help" (108), and therefore it is in god's best interest to help us to see his creation work towards beautiful, good ends, and as a purely good being (established in chapter 1), that is something he would do. This does make sense. We as humans are limited beings, and we cannot accomplish everything we set out to do unless we sorely limit what we set out to do--even then it is still likely we will fail once or twice. But, God wants us to succeed, because if there is a god, he is good (according to Swinburne, anyway--this is one point I do not feel he ever fully addressed), and we are his creation, and a good creator would want his creation to succeed at doing good things. Therefore, it makes perfect sense that God would intervene to help us achieve good ends every now and then, though not too often, as I will talk about in my Christian response below.
Christian Response
     The first thing that struck me in this chapter is the following sentence: "[God] will not... intervene in the natural order at all often, for if he did, we would not be able to predict the consequences of our actions and so we would lose control over the world and ourselves" (100-1). That is to say, referring to the previous chapter, God cannot allow us to experience the greater goods and happinesses of responsibility for ourselves and our world if he intervenes too much. This is, I think, a very valid point and a fantastic response to the common Christian supposition that the age of miracles is over, that the world we live in now is mundane. I do not think that just because Jesus does not walk the earth in human form any longer we are doomed to live unmiraculous lives every second that we are alive, but miracles are obviously rare--rare enough that when they do occur to you, most people will not believe you. We are a world full of skeptics, even those among us who call ourselves Christians. It is smart to be a skeptic to an extent, but if Christianity teaches one thing beyond simply a moral code, it is that faith is a necessary component of happiness, whether it is faith in the universe or faith in god or faith in other people, and I think it would be good for Christians to show the learning of that lesson by having in faith in the possibility that miracles could still occur, and knowing when to trust the word of another human being. I know this is a delicate line to walk,  the line between being trusting and being gullible, but it is just something to think about.
Personal Response
     I'll admit I was a little surprised at first when I read the title of this chapter. I thought, "Well, of COURSE the existence of God explains these things. How could it not?" But I then thought back to chapter one, and there really isn't anything that says God would do this kind of thing, and I thought about science, and over time it seems both more likely and less likely that science will be able to explain "supernatural" experiences--more likely because we get closer and more advanced, and less likely because the closer we get, the more complex everything appears to be.
     I also really liked a point Swinburne brought up about how "we may be mistaken in believing that an event is not a divine intervention when really it is, as well as the other way around" (106). This is so true. We have no right or reason to expect that we should know when god intervenes in our world or not, that we should be privy to his actions on our plane. God may have intervened in our lives several times when we passed events off as mere coincidences (although I no longer believe in coincidence, which makes me more likely to ascribe something to an act of god which was in fact only happenstance). This doesn't prove that there is a god, so may not be entirely relevant to the purpose of the book, but it shows that a healthy agnosticism in all things is a good thing, because we never know everything, and we never really know anything for certain, whether there is a god or no.

Friday, November 2, 2012

"Is There a God?": Notes on the Book by Richard Swinburne (VI/VIII)


For more about what's going on here, see this post.

For those of you who'd like to follow along, this is the book I am reading:
          Swinburne, Richard. Is There a God? Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.
Chapter VI: Why God Allows Evil
Summary
     In a nutshell, the reason Swinburne gives for God allowing evil is this: God would like to allow greater and more fulfilling goods into our life than simple happiness and contentment, such as "great responsibility for ourselves, each other, and the world, and thus a share in his own creative activity of determining what sort of world it is to be" (85), but those greater goods are simply not possible without allowing evils to pass. For example, he cannot give us responsibility for our successes if we do not experiences consequences for our failures. Some of this is simply that physical negative events must take place for great positive events to take place, but part of it is that we cannot properly experience great happiness, joy, and good without having something to contrast it to, without having properly experienced sadness, trouble, and evil.
Christian Response
     Swinburne's reference to God wanting us to take part in creation tickled me a bit, as this is a point J.R.R. Tolkien makes over and over in his writings, especially in the writings compiled in Tree and Leaf, and most especially in the poem "Mythopoeia" (a poem written to C.S. Lewis to convince him to believe in God--it worked). 
     I cannot think that the Christian response to Swinburne in this chapter could be anything but complete agreement. Swinburne makes sense, and his proposition explains many of the ills that come to pass both in the bible and throughout history since then. Without darkness, there cannot be light; without death, there cannot be life; without hardship, there cannot be success; without evil, there cannot be good.
     I always find myself in an interesting predicament when it comes to assessing the Christian response--as a Wiccan (who is in this sense best described as a monotheist, something for which many Wiccans would not call me such) I certainly believe in god and I certainly consider myself a moral being, but I am never certain just how that aligns with Christianity and where it splits off into something else. More and more as I examine Christianity I find that at it's core it is so similar to my religion and to every other well-respected religion (though I'm not sure it is fair to say that mine is among the well-respected religions of this world, and it is likely not), and that the only real difference is how we connect with god. But then, maybe I am being too forgiving and too openly interpretive of Christianity in the hopes that it will align with my own morals.
     There is one thing Swinburne mentions in this chapter that is a very Christian concept not in the sense that it is unique to Christianity (because it isn't), but in the sense that it is necessary to Christianity: "Being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privelege is forced upon you" (89), he says. Many times throughout the bible and across history post-bible, you hear of people acting as God's servants, or of God acting through people, or of people sacrificing themselves to God's cause, and this, when done properly, is what I think Swinburne is talking about. It is a very Christian view of suffering, and honestly a very beautiful one.
Personal Response
     I had been particularly excited to get to this chapter since I read chapter 1, which explained that God, if there was such a thing, was entirely good, and thus everything he created was perfectly good. How then would he explain evil? I will say that in the form of Wicca which I practice, the explanation is that while there is a perfectly good force within all things, everything happens for a good reason, and sometimes bad things need to happen to teach good lessons, or to set bigger good things into motion. 
     I think this is one of the most important chapters in this book if not the most important, as it is one of the biggest questions people ask when doubting the existence of a god. Many people become atheists in times of hardship because they feel god has not answers their prayers or seen to their needs, without realizing that there is indeed a sound reason for all evils. This is also the first chapter of this book in which I have been thoroughly interested.

     

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

"Is There a God?": Notes on the Book by Richard Swinburne (V/VIII)


For more about what's going on here, see this post.

For those of you who'd like to follow along, this is the book I am reading:
          Swinburne, Richard. Is There a God? Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.
Chapter V: How the Existence of God Explains the Existence of Humans
Summary
     Swinburne essentially states that god is a limitless superhuman soul unlimited by a human body. He describes the difference between physical events (things anyone can observe just as well as anyone else) and mental events (things that can only be observed by the person actually experiencing them), and then argues that the life of mental events each person experiences is our soul, and that "me" is greater than the sum of "my" parts. Christian Response
     It is difficult for me to respond to this section in a distinctly Christian way, because they bible is not a good reference when it comes to modern science--the bible says nothing about sub-atomic particles to my knowledge, and as far as I know it says nothing about brain surgery and the Frankenstein-ing process.
     However, I suppose that part of what I am  supposed to be learning in this class is not just the factual content of the bible, but Christianity and Christian ethics as practiced by real Christians, and real Christians tend to look to custom, intuition, and reason as well as to the bible's scripture. Reason gives us no means to argue with Swinburne on the value of "me" versus "my physical parts," and intuition certainly does not, for where does our intuition come from but from the "me" that is greater than its parts? I don't know how much experience can teach us about this, although I suppose comatose patients are a good example of a functioning body (sum of parts) without a functioning soul ("me"), even though recovery sometimes occurs. If recovery from a comatose state occurs, it is rarely full recovery, and often the "me" is very changed. A logical Christian would have no choice but to agree with Swinburne on this matter. Personal Response
     ...and, for that matter, a logical person. I'm not sure philosophy books are my thing, though. It's a little (read: incredibly) annoying having someone write out thoughts over pages and pages that my brain can process in a few milliseconds.

Thursday, October 18, 2012

"Is There a God?": Notes on the Book by Richard Swinburne (IV/VIII)


For more about what's going on here, see this post.

For those of you who'd like to follow along, this is the book I am reading:
          Swinburne, Richard. Is There a God? Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.
Chapter IV: How the Existence of God Explains the World and its Order
Summary
     Swinburne explains his personal viewpoint that the simplicity of god as a solution makes it the best possible answer for anyone asking "but why?" past the level of the materialistic existence of sub-atomic particles and their properties. He agrees completely with science on evolution and scientific theories of creation (the Big Bang), but denies chance as a possibility for why it all happened because the improbability of things happening the way they did is so high that it simply makes more sense for everything to have been caused by a limitless person with intent, viz., god. Christian Response
     I think the average Christian does not arrive at this conclusion because of repeatedly asking "why?" until there is not more scientific "why." Faith is a big part of Christianity, and I think, at this point, that actually trying to prove the existence of god goes against that faith, that it is a way of saying "the bible is not enough, I need to KNOW." I have never been a Christian, and I am well aware that there are many different kinds of Christians, but I think there is a point where Christian faith says "stop asking." Personal Response
     I was relieved that Swinburne not only addressed but agreed with science. I find his argument unconvincing because he relies on the idea that god is good--I have faith that god is good, but I have no real reason to suppose so. I personally have been very lucky. Others have not been so. Is it my business to know if god is good? Is he? I don't know. In any case, it bothers me that much of his argument relies on certain things being good, and whereas he tells us we need to ask for an ultimate explanation of things, he offers us no ultimate explanation for said things (people, beauty, god) being good other than that it is his personal opinion. You know there's something wrong with his argument when I agree with him and I still don't think he's convincing--clearly not biased.